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### How to Build a Low-tech Internet |
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|
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Wireless internet access is on the rise in both modern consumer |
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societies and in the developing world. |
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|
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In rich countries, however, the focus is on always-on connectivity and |
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ever higher access speeds. In poor countries, on the other hand, |
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connectivity is achieved through much more low-tech, often asynchronous |
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networks. |
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|
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While the high-tech approach pushes the costs and energy use of the |
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internet [higher and |
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higher](https://www.lowtechmagazine.com/2015/10/can-the-internet-run-on-renewable-energy.html), |
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the low-tech alternatives result in much cheaper and very energy |
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efficient networks that combine well with renewable power production and |
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are resistant to disruptions. |
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|
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If we want the internet to keep working in circumstances where access to |
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energy is more limited, we can learn important lessons from alternative |
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network technologies. Best of all, there\'s no need to wait for |
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governments or companies to facilitate: we can build our own resilient |
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communication infrastructure if we cooperate with one another. This is |
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demonstrated by several community networks in Europe, of which the |
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largest has more than 35,000 users already. |
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|
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[]{#anchor}Picture: A node in the [Scottish Tegola |
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Network](http://www.tegola.org.uk/hebnet/). |
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|
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More than half of the global population does not have access to the |
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\"worldwide\" web. Up to now, the internet is mainly an urban |
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phenomenon, especially in \"developing\" countries. Telecommunication |
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companies are usually reluctant to extend their network outside cities |
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due to a combination of high infrastructure costs, low population |
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density, limited ability to pay for services, and an unreliable or |
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non-existent electricity infrastructure. Even in remote regions of |
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\"developed\" countries, internet connectivity isn\'t always available. |
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|
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Internet companies such as Facebook and Google regularly make headlines |
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with plans for connecting these remote regions to the internet. Facebook |
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tries to achieve this with drones, while Google counts on high-altitude |
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balloons. There are major technological challenges, but the main |
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objection to these plans is their commercial character. Obviously, |
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Google and Facebook want to connect more people to the internet because |
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that would increase their revenues. Facebook especially receives lots of |
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criticism because their network promotes their own site in particular, |
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and blocks most other internet applications. \[1\] |
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|
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Meanwhile, several research groups and network enthusiasts have |
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developed and implemented much cheaper alternative network technologies |
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to solve these issues. Although these low-tech networks have proven |
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their worth, they have received much less attention. Contrary to the |
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projects of internet companies, they are set up by small organisations |
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or by the users themselves. This guarantees an open network that |
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benefits the users instead of a handful of corporations. At the same |
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time, these low-tech networks are very energy efficient. |
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|
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****WiFi-based Long Distance Networks**** |
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|
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Most low-tech networks are based on WiFi, the same technology that |
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allows mobile access to the internet in most western households. As we |
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have seen in the previous article, [sharing these devices could provide |
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free mobile access across densely populated |
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cities](https://www.lowtechmagazine.com/2015/10/the-4g-network-thats-already-there.html). |
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But the technology can be equally useful in sparsely populated areas. |
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Although the WiFi-standard was developed for short-distance data |
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communication (with a typical range of about 30 metres), its reach can |
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be extended through modifications of the Media Access Control (MAC) |
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layer in the networking protocol, and through the use of range extender |
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amplifiers and directional antennas. \[2\] |
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|
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Although the WiFi-standard was developed for short-distance data |
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communication, its reach can be extended to cover distances of more than |
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100 kilometres. |
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|
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The longest unamplified WiFi link is a 384 km wireless point-to-point |
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connection between Pico El Águila and Platillón in Venezuela, |
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established a few years ago. \[3,4\] However, WiFi-based long distance |
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networks usually consist of a combination of shorter point-to-point |
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links, each between a few kilometres and one hundred kilometers long at |
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most. These are combined to create larger, multihop networks. |
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Point-to-points links, which form the backbone of a long range WiFi |
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network, are combined with omnidirectional antennas that distribute the |
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signal to individual households (or public institutions) of a community. |
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|
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Picture: A relay with three point-to-point links and three sectoral |
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antennae. |
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[Tegola](http://www.tegola.org.uk/howto/network-planning.html). |
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|
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Long-distance WiFi links require line of sight to make a connection \-- |
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in this sense, the technology resembles the [18th century optical |
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telegraph](https://www.lowtechmagazine.com/2007/12/email-in-the-18.html). |
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\[5\] If there\'s no line of sight between two points, a third relay is |
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required that can see both points, and the signal is sent to the |
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intermediate relay first. Depending on the terrain and particular |
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obstacles, more hubs may be necessary. \[6\] |
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|
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Point-to-point links typically consist of two directional antennas, one |
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focused on the next node and the other on the previous node in the |
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network. Nodes can have multiple antennas with one antenna per fixed |
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point-to-point link to each neighbour. \[7\] This allows mesh routing |
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protocols that can dynamically select which links to choose for routing |
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among the available ones. \[8\] |
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|
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Long-distance WiFi links require line of sight to make a connection \-- |
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in this sense, the technology resembles the 18th century optical |
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telegraph. |
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|
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Distribution nodes usually consist of a sectoral antenna (a small |
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version of the things you see on mobile phone masts) or a conventional |
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WiFi-router, together with a number of receivers in the community. \[6\] |
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For short distance WiFi-communication, there is no requirement for line |
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of sight between the transmitter and the receiver. \[9\] |
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|
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To provide users with access to the worldwide internet, a long range |
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WiFi network should be connected to the main backbone of the internet |
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using at least one \"backhaul\" or \"gateway node\". This can be a |
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dial-up or broadband connection (DSL, fibre or satellite). If such a |
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link is not established, users would still be able to communicate with |
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each other and view websites set up on local servers, but they would not |
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be able to access the internet. \[10\] |
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|
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****Advantages of Long Range WiFi**** |
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|
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Long range WiFi offers high bandwidth (up to 54 Mbps) combined with very |
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low capital costs. Because the WiFi standard enjoys widespread |
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acceptance and has huge production volumes, off-the-shelf antennas and |
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wireless cards can be bought for very little money. \[11\] |
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Alternatively, components can be put together [from discarded |
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materials](http://roelof.info/projects/%282014%29Pretty_Fly_For_A_Wifi/) |
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such as old routers, satellite dish antennas and laptops. Protocols like |
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WiLDNet run on a 266 Mhz processor with only 128 MB memory, so an old |
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computer will do the trick. \[7\] |
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|
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The WiFi-nodes are lightweight and don\'t need expensive towers \-- |
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further decreasing capital costs, and minimizing the impact of the |
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structures to be built. \[7\] More recently, single units that combine |
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antenna, wireless card and processor have become available. These are |
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very convenient for installation. To build a relay, one simply connects |
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such units together with ethernet cables that carry both signal and |
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power. \[6\] The units can be mounted in towers or slim masts, given |
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that they offer little windload. \[3\] Examples of suppliers of long |
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range WiFi components are [Ubiquity](https://www.ubnt.com/), |
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[Alvarion](http://www.alvarion.com/) and |
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[MikroTik](http://www.mikrotik.com/), and |
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[simpleWiFi](https://www.simplewifi.com/). |
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|
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Long Range WiFi makes use of unlicensed spectrum and offers high |
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bandwidth, low capital costs, easy installation, and low power |
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requirements. |
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|
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Long range WiFi also has low operational costs due to low power |
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requirements. A typical mast installation consisting of two long |
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distance links and one or two wireless cards for local distribution |
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consumes around 30 watts. \[6,12\] In several low-tech networks, nodes |
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are entirely powered by solar panels and batteries. Another important |
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advantage of long range WiFi is that it makes use of unlicensed spectrum |
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(2.4 and 5 GHz), and thus avoids negotiations with telecom operators and |
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government. This adds to the cost advantage and allows basically anyone |
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to start a WiFi-based long distance network. \[9\] |
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|
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****Long Range WiFi Networks in Poor Countries**** |
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|
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The first long range WiFi networks were set up ten to fifteen years ago. |
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In poor countries, two main types have been built. The first is aimed at |
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providing internet access to people in remote villages. An example is |
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the Akshaya network in India, which covers the entire Kerala State and |
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is one of the largest wireless networks in the world. The infrastructure |
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is built around approximately 2,500 \"computer access centers\", which |
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are open to the local population \-- direct ownership of computers is |
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minimal in the region. \[13\] |
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|
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Another example, also in India, are the AirJaldi networks which provide |
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internet access to approximately 20,000 users in six states, all in |
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remote regions and on difficult terrain. Most nodes in this network are |
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solar-powered and the distance between them can range up to 50 km or |
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more. \[14\] In some African countries, local WiFi-networks distribute |
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internet access from a satellite gateway. \[15,16\] |
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|
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A node in the AirJaldi network. Picture: AirJaldi. |
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|
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A second type of long distance WiFi network in poor countries is aimed |
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at providing telemedicine to remote communities. In remote regions, |
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health care is often provided through health posts scarcely equipped and |
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attended by health technicians who are barely trained. \[17\] Long-range |
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WiFi networks can connect urban hospitals with these outlying health |
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posts, allowing doctors to remotely support health technicians using |
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high-resolution file transfers and real-time communication tools based |
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on voice and video. |
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|
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An example is the link between Cabo Pantoja and Iquitos in the Loreto |
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province in Peru, which was established in 2007. The 450 km network |
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consists of 17 towers which are 16 to 50 km apart. The line connects 15 |
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medical outposts in remote villages with the main hospital in Iquitos |
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and is aimed at remote diagnosis of patients. \[17,18\] All equipment is |
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powered by solar panels. \[18,19\] Other succesful examples of long |
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range WiFi telemedicine networks have been built in India, Malawi and |
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Ghana. \[20,21\] |
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|
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****WiFi-Based Community Networks in Europe**** |
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|
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The low-tech networks in poor countries are set up by NGO\'s, |
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governments, universities or businesses. In contrast, most of the |
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WiFi-based long distance networks in remote regions of rich countries |
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are so-called \"community networks\": the users themselves build, own, |
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power and maintain the infrastructure. Similar to the shared wireless |
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approach in cities, reciprocal resource sharing forms the basis of these |
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networks: participants can set up their own node and connect to the |
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network (for free), as long as their node also allows traffic of other |
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members. Each node acts as a WiFi routing device that provides IP |
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forwarding services and a data link to all users and nodes connected to |
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it. \[8,22\] |
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|
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In a community network, the users themselves build, own, power and |
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maintain the infrastructure. |
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|
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Consequently, with each new user, the network becomes larger. There is |
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no a-priori overall planning. A community network grows bottom-up, |
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driven by the needs of its users, as nodes and links are added or |
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upgraded following demand patterns. The only consideration is to connect |
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a node from a new participant to an existing one. As a node is powered |
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on, it discovers it neighbours, attributes itself a unique IP adress, |
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and then establishes the most appropriate routes to the rest of the |
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network, taking into account the quality of the links. Community |
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networks are open to participation to everyone, sometimes according to |
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an open peering agreement. \[8,9,19,22\] |
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|
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Wireless links in the Spanish Guifi network. |
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[Credit](https://iuliinet.github.io/presentazione_ottobre_2014/img/barcellona.jpg). |
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|
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Despite the lack of reliable statistics, community networks seem to be |
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rather succesful, and there are several large ones in Europe, such as |
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[Guifi.net](https://guifi.net/) (Spain), [Athens Wireless Metropolitan |
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Network](http://www.awmn.gr/content.php?s=ce506a41ab245641d6934638c6f6f107) |
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(Greece), [FunkFeuer](http://www.funkfeuer.at/) (Austria), and |
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[Freifunk](https://freifunk.net/en/) (Germany). \[8,22,23,24\] The |
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Spanish network is the largest WiFi-based long distance network in the |
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world with more than 50,000 kilometres of links, although a small part |
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is based on optic fibre links. Most of it is located in the Catalan |
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Pyrenees, one of the least populated areas in Spain. The network was |
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initiated in 2004 and now has close to 30,000 nodes, up from 17,000 in |
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2012. \[8,22\] |
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|
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Guifi.net provides internet access to individuals, companies, |
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administrations and universities. In principle, the network is |
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installed, powered and maintained by its users, although volunteer teams |
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and even commercial installers are present to help. Some nodes and |
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backbone upgrades have been succesfully crowdfunded by indirect |
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beneficiaries of the network. \[8,22\] |
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|
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****Performance of Low-tech Networks**** |
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|
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So how about the performance of low-tech networks? What can you do with |
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them? The available bandwidth per user can vary enormously, depending on |
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the bandwidth of the gateway node(s) and the number of users, among |
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other factors. The long-distance WiFi networks aimed at telemedicine in |
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poor countries have few users and a good backhaul, resulting in high |
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bandwidth (+ 40 Mbps). This gives them a similar performance to fibre |
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connections in the developed world. A study of (a small part of) the |
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Guifi.net community network, which has dozens of gateway nodes and |
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thousands of users, showed an average throughput of 2 Mbps, which is |
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comparable to a relatively slow DSL connection. Actual throughput per |
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user varies from 700 kbps to 8 Mbps. \[25\] |
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|
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The available bandwidth per user can vary enormously, depending on the |
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bandwidth of the gateway node(s) and the number of users, among other |
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factors |
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|
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However, the low-tech networks that distribute internet access to a |
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large user base in developing countries can have much more limited |
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bandwidth per user. For example, a university campus in Kerala (India) |
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uses a 750 kbps internet connection that is shared across 3,000 faculty |
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members and students operating from 400 machines, where during peak |
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hours nearly every machine is being used. |
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|
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Therefore, the worst-case average bandwidth available per machine is |
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approximately 1.9 kbps, which is slow even in comparison to a dial-up |
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connection (56 kbps). And this can be considered a really good |
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connectivity compared to typical rural settings in poor countries. |
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\[26\] To make matters worse, such networks often have to deal with an |
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intermittent power supply. |
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|
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Under these circumstances, even the most common internet applications |
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have poor performance, or don\'t work at all. The communication model of |
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the internet is based on a set of network assumptions, called the TCP/IP |
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protocol suite. These include the existence of a bi-directional |
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end-to-end path between the source (for example a website\'s server) and |
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the destination (the user\'s computer), short round-trip delays, and low |
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error rates. |
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|
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Many low-tech networks in poor countries do not comform to these |
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assumptions. They are characterized by intermittent connectivity or |
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\"network partitioning\" \-- the absence of an end-to-end path between |
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source and destination \-- long and variable delays, and high error |
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rates. \[21,27,28\] |
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|
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****Delay-Tolerant Networks**** |
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|
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Nevertheless, even in such conditions, the internet could work perfectly |
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fine. The technical issues can be solved by moving away from the |
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always-on model of traditional networks, and instead design networks |
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based upon asynchronous communication and intermittent connectivity. |
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These so-called \"delay-tolerant networks\" (DTNs) have their own |
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specialized protocols overlayed on top of the lower protocols and do not |
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utilize TCP. They overcome the problems of intermittent connectivity and |
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long delays by using store-and-forward message switching. |
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|
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Information is forwarded from a storage place on one node to a storage |
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place on another node, along a path that *eventually* reaches its |
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destination. In contrast to traditional internet routers, which only |
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store incoming packets for a few milliseconds on memory chips, the nodes |
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of a delay-tolerant network have persistent storage (such as hard disks) |
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that can hold information indefinitely. \[27,28\] |
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|
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Delay-tolerant networks combine well with renewable energy: solar panels |
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or wind turbines could power network nodes only when the sun shines or |
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the wind blows, eliminating the need for energy storage. |
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|
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Delay-tolerant networks don\'t require an end-to-end path between source |
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and destination. Data is simply transferred from node to node. If the |
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next node is unavailable because of long delays or a power outage, the |
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data is stored on the hard disk until the node becomes available again. |
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While it might take a long time for data to travel from source to |
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destination, a delay-tolerant network ensures that it will eventually |
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arrive. |
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|
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Delay-tolerant networks further decrease capital costs and energy use, |
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leading to the most efficient use of scarce resources. They keep working |
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with an intermittent energy supply and they combine well with renewable |
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energy sources: solar panels or wind turbines could power network nodes |
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only when the sun shines or the wind blows, eliminating the need for |
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energy storage. |
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|
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****Data Mules**** |
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|
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Delay-tolerant networking can take surprising forms, especially when |
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they take advantage of some non-traditional means of communication, such |
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as \"data mules\". \[11,29\] In such networks, conventional |
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transportation technologies \-- buses, cars, motorcycles, trains, boats, |
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airplanes \-- are used to ferry messages from one location to another in |
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a store-and-forward manner. |
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|
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Examples are DakNet and KioskNet, which use buses as data mules. |
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\[30-34\] In many developing regions, rural bus routes regularly visit |
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villages and towns that have no network connectivity. By equipping each |
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vehicle with a computer, a storage device and a mobile WiFi-node on the |
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one hand, and by installing a stationary WiFi-node in each village on |
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the other hand, the local transport infrastructure can substitute for a |
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wireless internet link. \[11\] |
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|
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Picture: AirJaldi. |
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|
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Outgoing data (such as sent emails or requests for webpages) is stored |
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on local computers in the village until the bus comes withing range. At |
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this point, the fixed WiFi-node of the local computer automatically |
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transmits the data to the mobile WiFi-node of the bus. Later, when the |
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bus arrives at a hub that is connected to the internet, the outgoing |
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data is transmitted from the mobile WiFi-node to the gateway node, and |
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then to the internet. Data sent to the village takes the opposite route. |
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The bus \-- or data \-- driver doesn\'t require any special skills and |
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is completely oblivious to the data transfers taking place. He or she |
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does not need to do anything other than come in range of the nodes. |
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\[30,31\] |
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|
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In a data mules network, the local transport infrastructure substitutes |
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for a wireless internet link. |
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|
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The use of data mules offers some extra advantages over more |
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\"sophisticated\" delay-tolerant networks. A \"drive-by\" WiFi network |
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allows for small, low-cost and low-power radio devices to be used, which |
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don\'t require line of sight and consequently no towers \-- further |
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lowering capital costs and energy use compared to other low-tech |
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networks. \[30,31,32\] |
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|
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The use of short-distance WiFi-links also results in a higher bandwidth |
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compared to long-distance WiFi-links, which makes data mules better |
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suited to transfer larger files. On average, 20 MB of data can be moved |
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in each direction when a bus passes a fixed WiFi-node. \[30,32\] On the |
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other hand, latency (the time interval between sending and receiving |
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data) is usually higher than on long-range WiFi-links. A single bus |
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passing by a village once a day gives a latency of 24 hours. |
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|
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****Delay-Tolerant Software**** |
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|
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Obviously, a delay-tolerant network (DTN) \-- whatever its form \-- also |
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requires new software: applications that function without a connected |
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end-to-end networking path. \[11\] Such custom applications are also |
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useful for synchronous, low bandwidth networks. Email is relatively easy |
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to adapt to intermittent connectivity, because it\'s an asynchronous |
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communication method by itself. A DTN-enabled email client stores |
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outgoing messages until a connection is available. Although emails may |
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take longer to reach their destination, the user experience doesn\'t |
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really change. |
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|
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A Freifunk WiFi-node is installed in Berlin, Germany. Picture:[ |
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Wikipedia |
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Commons](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/51/Freifunk-Initiative_in_Berlin-Kreuzberg.jpg). |
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|
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Browsing and searching the web requires more adaptations. For example, |
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most search engines optimize for speed, assuming that a user can quickly |
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look through the returned links and immediately run a second modified |
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search if the first result is inadequate. However, in intermittent |
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networks, multiple rounds of interactive search would be impractical. |
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\[26,35\] Asynchronous search engines optimize for bandwith rather than |
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response time. \[26,30,31,35,36\] For example, RuralCafe desynchronizes |
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the search process by performing many search tasks in an offline manner, |
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refining the search request based on a database of similar searches. The |
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actual retrieval of information using the network is only done when |
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absolutely necessary. |
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|
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Many internet applications could be adapted to intermittent networks, |
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such as webbrowsing, email, electronic form filling, interaction with |
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e-commerce sites, blogsoftware, large file downloads, or social media. |
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|
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Some DTN-enabled browsers download not only the explicitly requested |
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webpages but also the pages that are linked to by the requested pages. |
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\[30\] Others are optimized to return low-bandwidth results, which are |
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achieved by filtering, analysis, and compression on the server site. A |
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similar effect can be achieved through the use of a service like |
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[Loband](http://www.loband.org/loband/), which strips webpages of |
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images, video, advertisements, social media buttons, and so on, merely |
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presenting the textual content. \[26\] |
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|
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Browsing and searching on intermittent networks can also be improved by |
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local caching (storing already downloaded pages) and prefetching |
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(downloading pages that might be retrieved in the future). \[206\] Many |
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other internet applications could also be adapted to intermittent |
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networks, such as electronic form filling, interaction with e-commerce |
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sites, blogsoftware, large file downloads, social media, and so on. |
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\[11,30\] All these applications would remain possible, though at lower |
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speeds. |
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|
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****Sneakernets**** |
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|
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Obviously, real-time applications such as internet telephony, media |
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streaming, chatting or videoconferencing are impossible to adapt to |
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intermittent networks, which provide only asynchronous communication. |
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These applications are also difficult to run on synchronous networks |
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that have limited bandwidth. Because these are the applications that are |
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in large part responsible for the growing energy use of the internet, |
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one could argue that their incompatibility with low-tech networks is |
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actually a good thing (see the [previous |
|||
article](https://www.lowtechmagazine.com/2015/10/can-the-internet-run-on-renewable-energy.html)). |
|||
|
|||
Furthermore, many of these applications could be organized in different |
|||
ways. While real-time voice or video conversations won\'t work, it\'s |
|||
perfectly possible to send and receive voice or video messages. And |
|||
while streaming media can\'t happen, downloading music albums and video |
|||
remains possible. Moreover, these files could be \"transmitted\" by the |
|||
most low-tech internet technology available: a sneakernet. In a |
|||
sneakernet, digital data is \"wirelessly\" transmitted using a storage |
|||
medium such as a hard disk, a USB-key, a flash card, or a CD or DVD. |
|||
Before the arrival of the internet, all computer files were exchanged |
|||
via a sneakernet, using tape or floppy disks as a storage medium. |
|||
|
|||
Stuffing a cargo train full of digital storage media would beat any |
|||
digital network in terms of speed, cost and energy efficiency. Picture: |
|||
Wikipedia Commons. |
|||
|
|||
Just like a data mules network, a sneakernet involves a vehicle, a |
|||
messenger on foot, or an animal (such as a [carrier |
|||
pigeon](https://www.lowtechmagazine.com/2009/02/sneakernet-beats-internet.html)). |
|||
However, in a sneakernet there is no automatic data transfer between the |
|||
mobile node (for instance, a vehicle) and the stationary nodes (sender |
|||
and recipient). Instead, the data first have to be transferred from the |
|||
sender\'s computer to a portable storage medium. Then, upon arrival, the |
|||
data have to be transferred from the portable storage medium to the |
|||
receiver\'s computer. \[30\] A sneakernet thus requires manual |
|||
intervention and this makes it less convenient for many internet |
|||
applications. |
|||
|
|||
There are exceptions, though. For example, a movie doesn\'t have to be |
|||
transferred to the hard disk of your computer in order to watch it. You |
|||
play it straight from a portable hard disk or slide a disc into the |
|||
DVD-player. Moreover, a sneakernet also offers an important advantage: |
|||
of all low-tech networks, it has the most bandwidth available. This |
|||
makes it perfectly suited for the distribution of large files such as |
|||
movies or computer games. In fact, when very large files are involved, a |
|||
sneakernet even beats the fastest fibre internet connection. At lower |
|||
internet speeds, sneakernets can be advantageous for much smaller files. |
|||
|
|||
Technological progress will not lower the advantage of a sneakernet. |
|||
Digital storage media evolve at least as fast as internet connections |
|||
and they both improve communication in an equal way. |
|||
|
|||
****Resilient Networks**** |
|||
|
|||
While most low-tech networks are aimed at regions where the alternative |
|||
is often no internet connection at all, their usefulness for |
|||
well-connected areas cannot be overlooked. The internet as we know it in |
|||
the industrialized world is a product of an abundant energy supply, a |
|||
robust electricity infrastructure, and sustained economic growth. This |
|||
\"high-tech\" internet might offer some fancy advantages over the |
|||
low-tech networks, but it cannot survive if these conditions change. |
|||
This makes it extremely vulnerable. |
|||
|
|||
The internet as we know it in the industrialized world is a product of |
|||
an abundant energy supply, a robust electricity infrastructure, and |
|||
sustained economic growth. It cannot survive if these conditions change. |
|||
|
|||
Depending on their level of resilience, low-tech networks can remain in |
|||
operation when the supply of fossil fuels is interrupted, when the |
|||
electricity infrastructure deteriorates, when the economy grinds to a |
|||
halt, or if other calamities should hit. Such a low-tech internet would |
|||
allow us to surf the web, send and receive e-mails, shop online, share |
|||
content, and so on. Meanwhile, data mules and sneakernets could serve to |
|||
handle the distribution of large files such as videos. Stuffing a cargo |
|||
vessel or a train full of digital storage media would beat any digital |
|||
network in terms of speed, cost and energy efficiency. And if such a |
|||
transport infrastructure would no longer be available, we could still |
|||
rely on messengers on foot, [cargo |
|||
bikes](https://www.lowtechmagazine.com/2014/05/modular-cargo-cycles.html) |
|||
and [sailing vessels](https://www.lowtechmagazine.com/sailing-ships/). |
|||
|
|||
Such a hybrid system of online and offline applications would remain a |
|||
very powerful communication network \-- unlike anything we had even in |
|||
the late twentieth century. Even if we envision a doom scenario in which |
|||
the wider internet infrastructure would disintegrate, isolated low-tech |
|||
networks would still be very useful local and regional communication |
|||
technologies. Furthermore, they could obtain content from other remote |
|||
networks through the exchange of portable storage media. The internet, |
|||
it appears, can be as low-tech or high-tech as we can afford it to be. |
|||
|
|||
Kris De Decker (edited by [Jenna |
|||
Collett](https://www.linkedin.com/pub/jenna-collett/1a/925/b3)) |
|||
|
|||
This article has been translated into |
|||
[Spanish](https://solar.lowtechmagazine.com/es/2015/10/how-to-build-a-low-tech-internet.html). |
|||
|
|||
****Sources & Notes:**** |
|||
|
|||
DIY: [Wireless networking in the developing |
|||
world](http://wndw.net/book.html#readBook) (Third Edition) is a free |
|||
book about designing, implementing and maintaining low-cost wireless |
|||
networks. Available in English, French, and Spanish. |
|||
|
|||
\[1\] [Connecting the unwired world with balloons, satellites, lasers & |
|||
drones](https://tech.slashdot.org/story/15/09/03/214256/connecting-the-unwired-world-with-balloons-satellites-lasers-drones), |
|||
Slashdot, 2015 |
|||
|
|||
\[2\] [A QoS-aware dynamic bandwidth allocation scheme for multi-hop |
|||
WiFi-based long distance |
|||
networks](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1186%2Fs13638-015-0352-z#/page-1), |
|||
Iftekhar Hussain et al., 2015 |
|||
|
|||
\[3\] [Long-distance, Low-Cost Wireless Data |
|||
Transmission](http://www.ursi.org/files/RSBissues/RSB_339_2011_12.pdf) |
|||
(PDF), Ermanno Pietrosemoli, 2011 |
|||
|
|||
\[4\] This link could only be established thanks to the height of the |
|||
endpoints (4,200 and 1,500 km) and the flatness of the middle ground. |
|||
The curvature of the Earth makes longer point-to-point WiFi-links |
|||
difficult to achieve because line of sight between two points is |
|||
required. |
|||
|
|||
\[5\] Radio waves occupy a volume around the optical line, which must be |
|||
unemcumbered from obstacles. This volume is known as the Fresnel |
|||
ellipsoid and its size grows with the distance between the two end |
|||
points and with the wavelength of the signal, which is in turn inversely |
|||
proportional to the frequency. Thus, it is required to leave extra |
|||
\"elbow room\" for the Fresnel zone. \[9\] |
|||
|
|||
\[6\] [A Brief History of the Tegola |
|||
Project](http://www.tegola.org.uk/tegola-history.html), Tegola Project, |
|||
retrieved October 2015 |
|||
|
|||
\[7\] [WiLDNet: Design and Implementation of High Performance WiFi based |
|||
Long Distance |
|||
Networks](http://tier.cs.berkeley.edu/docs/wireless/wild_multihop.pdf) |
|||
(PDF), Rabin Patra et al., 2007 |
|||
|
|||
\[8\] [Topology Patterns of a Community Network: |
|||
Guifi.net](http://dsg.ac.upc.edu/sites/default/files/1569633605.pdf) |
|||
(PDF), Davide Vega et al., 2012 |
|||
|
|||
\[9\] [Global Access to the Internet for All, internet |
|||
draft](https://trac.tools.ietf.org/group/irtf/trac/wiki/gaia), Internet |
|||
Engineering Task Force (IETF), 2015 |
|||
|
|||
\[10\] This is what happened to Afghanistan\'s JLINK network when |
|||
[funding for the network\'s satellite link ran dry in |
|||
2012](https://www.wired.com/2012/05/jlink/). |
|||
|
|||
\[11\] [The case for technology in developing |
|||
regions](https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~mattkam/lab/publications/Computer2005.pdf) |
|||
(PDF), Eric Brewer et al., 2005 |
|||
|
|||
\[12\] [Beyond Pilots: Keeping Rural Wireless Networks |
|||
Alive](https://www.usenix.org/legacy/event/nsdi08/tech/full_papers/surana/surana.pdf) |
|||
(PDF), Sonesh Surana et al., 2008 |
|||
|
|||
\[13\] <http://www.akshaya.kerala.gov.in/> |
|||
|
|||
\[14\] <http://main.airjaldi.com/> |
|||
|
|||
\[15\] [VillageCell: Cost Effective Cellular Connectivity in Rural |
|||
Areas](http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~pejovicv/docs/Anand12ICTD.pdf) (PDF), |
|||
Abhinav Anand et al., 2012 |
|||
|
|||
\[16\] [Deployment and Extensio of a Converged WiMAX/WiFi Network for |
|||
Dwesa Community Area South |
|||
Africa](http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.452.7357&rep=rep1&type=pdf) |
|||
(PDF), N. Ndlovu et al., 2009 |
|||
|
|||
\[17\] \"[A telemedicine network optimized for long distances in the |
|||
Amazonian jungle of |
|||
Peru](http://www.ehas.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Extremecomm_sig_ISBN.pdf)\" |
|||
(PDF), Carlos Rey-Moreno, ExtremeCom \'11, September 2011 |
|||
|
|||
\[18\] \"[Telemedicine networks of EHAS Foundation in Latin |
|||
America](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4197650/)\", |
|||
Ignacio Prieto-Egido et al., in \"Frontiers in Public Health\", October |
|||
15, 2014. |
|||
|
|||
\[19\] \"[The design of a wireless solar-powered router for rural |
|||
environments isolated from health |
|||
facilities](https://eciencia.urjc.es/bitstream/handle/10115/2293/THE%20DESIGN%20OF%20A%20WIRELESS%20SOLAR-POWERED-2008.pdf?sequence=1)\" |
|||
(PDF), Francisco Javier Simo Reigadas et al., in \"IEEE Wireless |
|||
Communications\", June 2008. |
|||
|
|||
\[20\] [On a long wireless link for rural telemedicine in |
|||
Malawi](http://users.ictp.it/~mzennaro/Malawi.pdf) (PDF), M. Zennaro et |
|||
al., 2008 |
|||
|
|||
\[21\] [A Survey of Delay- and Disruption-Tolerant Networking |
|||
Applications](http://www.jie-online.org/index.php/jie/article/view/91), |
|||
Artemios G. Voyiatzis, 2012 |
|||
|
|||
\[22\] [Supporting Cloud Deployment in the Guifi Community |
|||
Network](https://www.sics.se/~amir/files/download/papers/guifi.pdf) |
|||
(PDF), Roger Baig et al., 2013 |
|||
|
|||
\[23\] [A Case for Research with and on Community |
|||
Networks](http://www.sigcomm.org/sites/default/files/ccr/papers/2013/July/2500098-2500108.pdf) |
|||
(PDF), Bart Braem et.al, 2013 |
|||
|
|||
\[24\] There are smaller networks in Scotland |
|||
([Tegola](http://www.tegola.org.uk/)), Slovenia ([wlan |
|||
slovenija](https://wlan-si.net/)), Belgium ([Wireless |
|||
Antwerpen](http://www.wirelessantwerpen.be/)), and the Netherlands |
|||
([Wireless Leiden](https://www.wirelessleiden.nl/)), among others. |
|||
Australia has [Melbourne Wireless](http://melbourne.wireless.org.au/). |
|||
In Latin America, numerous examples exists, such as [Bogota |
|||
Mesh](https://www.facebook.com/BogotaMesh) (Colombia) and [Monte Video |
|||
Libre](http://picandocodigo.net/2008/montevideolibre-redes-libres-en-montevideo/) |
|||
(Uruguay). Some of these networks are interconnected. This is the case |
|||
for the Belgian and Dutch community networks, and for the Slovenian and |
|||
Austrian networks. \[8,22,23\] |
|||
|
|||
\[25\] [Proxy performance analysis in a community wireless |
|||
network](http://upcommons.upc.edu/handle/2099.1/19710), Pablo Pitarch |
|||
Miguel, 2013 |
|||
|
|||
\[26\] [RuralCafe: Web Search in the Rural Developing |
|||
World](http://www.ambuehler.ethz.ch/CDstore/www2009/proc/docs/p411.pdf) |
|||
(PDF), Jay Chen et al., 2009 |
|||
|
|||
\[27\] [A Delay-Tolerant Network Architecture for Challenged |
|||
Networks](http://www.kevinfall.com/seipage/papers/p27-fall.pdf) (PDF), |
|||
Kevin Fall, 2003 |
|||
|
|||
\[28\] [Delay- and Disruption-Tolerant Networks (DTNs) \-- A Tutorial |
|||
(version |
|||
2.0)](http://ipnsig.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/DTN_Tutorial_v2.04.pdf) |
|||
(PDF), Forrest Warthman, 2012 |
|||
|
|||
\[29\] [Healthcare Supported by Data Mule Networks in Remote Communities |
|||
of the Amazon |
|||
Region](http://www.hindawi.com/journals/isrn/2014/730760/), Mauro |
|||
Margalho Coutinho et al., 2014 |
|||
|
|||
\[30\] [First Mile Solutions\' Daknet Takes Rural Communities |
|||
Online](http://www.firstmilesolutions.com/documents/FMS_Case_Study.pdf) |
|||
(PDF), Carol Chyau and Jean-Francois Raymond, 2005 |
|||
|
|||
\[31\] [DakNet: A Road to Universal Broadband |
|||
Connectivity](http://courses.media.mit.edu/2003fall/de/DakNet-Case.pdf) |
|||
(PDF), Amir Alexander Hasson et al., 2003 |
|||
|
|||
\[32\] [DakNet: Architecture and Connectivity in Developing |
|||
Nations](http://ijpret.com/publishedarticle/2015/4/IJPRET%20-%20ECN%20115.pdf) |
|||
(PDF), Madhuri Bhole, 2015 |
|||
|
|||
\[33\] [Delay Tolerant Networks and Their |
|||
Applications](http://www.citeulike.org/user/tnhh/article/13517347), |
|||
Longxiang Gao et al., 2015 |
|||
|
|||
\[34\] [Low-cost communication for rural internet kiosks using |
|||
mechanical |
|||
backhaul](https://people.csail.mit.edu/matei/papers/2006/mobicom_kiosks.pdf), |
|||
A. Seth et al., 2006 |
|||
|
|||
\[35\] [Searching the World Wide Web in Low-Connectivity |
|||
Communities](http://tek.sourceforge.net/papers/tek-www02.pdf) (PDF), |
|||
William Thies et al., 2002 |
|||
|
|||
\[36\] [Slow Search: Information Retrieval without Time |
|||
Constraints](https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~yubink/hcir2013.pdf) (PDF), Jaime |
|||
Teevan, 2013 |
|||
|
|||
\[37\] [Potential for Collaborative Caching and Prefetching in |
|||
Largely-Disconnected |
|||
Villages](http://mrmgroup.cs.princeton.edu/papers/isaacman-winsdr503.pdf) |
|||
(PDF), Sibren Isaacman et al., 2008 |
|||
|
|||
-- |
|||
-- |
|||
|
|||
Posted on October 26, 2015 at 12:26 AM in [Access to |
|||
information](https://www.lowtechmagazine.com/copyright_and_access_to_information/), |
|||
[Communications](https://www.lowtechmagazine.com/communications/), |
|||
[Cover story](https://www.lowtechmagazine.com/cover-story/), |
|||
[DIY](https://www.lowtechmagazine.com/diy/), |
|||
[Internet](https://www.lowtechmagazine.com/internet/), [Wireless |
|||
technology](https://www.lowtechmagazine.com/wireless_technology/) \| |
|||
[Permalink](https://www.lowtechmagazine.com/2015/10/how-to-build-a-low-tech-internet.html) |
|||
@ -0,0 +1,398 @@ |
|||
Title: Re-Centralization of AI focusing on Social Justice |
|||
Author: Adnan Hadzi, Denis Roio |
|||
|
|||
# RE - CENTRALIZATION OF AI FOCUSING ON SOCIAL JUSTICE |
|||
|
|||
In order to lay the foundations for a discussion around |
|||
the argument that the adoption of artificial |
|||
intelligence (AI) technologies benefits the powerful |
|||
few, 1 focussing on their own existential concerns, 2 we |
|||
decided to narrow down our analysis of the argument |
|||
to social justic (i.e. restorative justice). This paper |
|||
signifies an edited version of Adnan Hadzi’s text on |
|||
Social Justice and Artificial Intelligence, 3 exploring the |
|||
notion of humanised artificial intelligence 4 in order to |
|||
discuss potential challenges society might face in the |
|||
future. The paper does not discuss current forms and |
|||
applications of artificial intelligence, as, so far, there |
|||
is no AI technology, which is self-conscious and self- |
|||
aware, being able to deal with emotional and social |
|||
intelligence. 5 It is a discussion around AI as a speculative |
|||
hypothetical entity. One could then ask, if such a speculative |
|||
self-conscious hardware/software system were created, at what |
|||
point could one talk of personhood? And what criteria could |
|||
there be in order to say an AI system was capable of |
|||
committing AI crimes? |
|||
Concerning what constitutes AI crimes the paper uses the |
|||
criteria given in Thomas King et al.’s paper Artificial |
|||
Intelligence Crime: An Interdisciplinary Analysis of Foreseeable |
|||
Threats and Solutions, 6 where King et al. coin the term “AI |
|||
crime”. We discuss the construction of the legal system through |
|||
the lens of political involvement of what one may want to |
|||
consider to be ‘powerful elites’ 7 . In doing so we will be |
|||
demonstrating that it is difficult to prove that the adoption of AI |
|||
technologies is undertaken in a way, which mainly serves a |
|||
powerful class in society. Nevertheless, analysing the culture |
|||
around AI technologies with regard to the nature of law with a |
|||
philosophical and sociological focus enables us to demonstrate |
|||
a utilitarian and authoritarian trend in the adoption of AI |
|||
technologies. Mason argues that “virtue ethics is the only |
|||
ethics fit for the task of imposing collective human control on |
|||
thinking machines” 8 and AI. We will apply virtue ethics to our |
|||
discourse around artificial intelligence and ethics. |
|||
As expert in AI safety Steve Omonhundro believes that AI is |
|||
“likely to behave in antisocial and harmful ways unless they are |
|||
very carefully designed.” 9 It is through virtue ethics that this |
|||
paper will propose for such a design to be centred around |
|||
restorative justice in order to take control over AI and thinking |
|||
machines, following Mason’s radical defence of the human and |
|||
his critique of current thoughts within trans- and post- |
|||
humanism as a submission to machine logic. |
|||
|
|||
The paper will conclude by proposing an alternative |
|||
practically unattainable, approach to the current legal system |
|||
by looking into restorative justice for AI crimes, 10 and how the |
|||
ethics of care could be applied to AI technologies. In conclusion |
|||
the paper will discuss affect 11 and humanised artificial |
|||
intelligence with regards to the emotion of shame, when |
|||
dealing with AI crimes. |
|||
In order to discuss AI in relation to personhood this paper |
|||
follows the descriptive psychology method 12 of the paradigm |
|||
case formulation 13 developed by Peter Ossorio. 14 Similar to how |
|||
some animal rights activists call for certain animals to be |
|||
recognised as non-human persons, 15 this paper speculates on |
|||
the notion of AI as a non-human person being able to reflect on |
|||
ethical concerns. 16 Here Wynn Schwartz argues that “it is |
|||
reasonable to include non-humans as persons and to have |
|||
legitimate grounds for disagreeing where the line is properly |
|||
drawn. In good faith, competent judges using this formulation |
|||
can clearly point to where and why they agree or disagree on |
|||
what is to be included in the category of persons.” 17 |
|||
In the case of AI technologies we ask whether the current |
|||
vision for the adoption of AI technologies, a vision which is |
|||
mainly supporting the military-industrial complex through vast |
|||
investments in army AI, 18 is a vision that benefits mainly |
|||
powerful elites. In order to discuss these questions, one has to |
|||
analyse the history of AI technologies leading to the kind of |
|||
‘humanised’ AI system this paper posits. The old-fashioned |
|||
approach, 19 some may still say contemporary approach, was to |
|||
primarily research into ‘mind-only’ 20 AI technologies/systems. |
|||
Through high level reasoning, researchers were optimistic that |
|||
AI technology would quickly become a reality. |
|||
Those early AI technologies were a disembodied approach |
|||
using high level logical and abstract symbols. By the end of the |
|||
80s researchers found that the disembodied approach was not |
|||
even achieving low level tasks humans could easily perform. 21 |
|||
During that period many researchers stopped working on AI |
|||
technologies and systems, and the period is often referred to as |
|||
the “AI winter”. 22 |
|||
Rodney Brooks then came forward with the proposition of |
|||
“Nouvelle AI”, 23 arguing that the old-fashioned approach did |
|||
|
|||
not take into consideration motor skills and neural networks. |
|||
Only by the end of the 90s did researchers develop statistical |
|||
AI systems without the need for any high-level logical |
|||
reasoning; 24 instead AI systems were ‘guessing’ through |
|||
algorithms and machine learning. This signalled a first step |
|||
towards humanistic artificial intelligence, as this resembles |
|||
how humans make intuitive decisions; 25 here researchers |
|||
suggest that embodiment improves cognition. 26 |
|||
With embodiment theory Brooks argued that AI systems |
|||
would operate best when computing only the data that was |
|||
absolutely necessary. 27 Further in Developing Embodied |
|||
Multisensory Dialogue Agents Michal Paradowski argues that |
|||
without considering embodiment, e.g. the physics of the brain, |
|||
it is not possible to create AI technologies/systems capable of |
|||
comprehension. |
|||
Foucault’s theories are especially helpful in discussing how |
|||
the “rule of truth” has disciplined civilisation, allowing for an |
|||
adoption of AI technologies which seem to benefit mainly the |
|||
upper-class. But then should we think of a notion of ‘deep-truth’ |
|||
as the unwieldy product of deep learning AI algorithms? |
|||
Discussions around truth, Foucault states, form legislation into |
|||
something that “decides, transmits and itself extends upon the |
|||
effects of power” 28 . Foucault’s theories help to explain how |
|||
legislation, as an institution, is rolled out throughout society |
|||
with very little resistance, or “proletarian counter-justice” 29 . |
|||
|
|||
Foucault explains that this has made the justice system and |
|||
legislation a for-profit system. With this understanding of |
|||
legislation, and social justice, one does need to reflect further |
|||
on Foucault’s notion of how disciplinary power seeks to express |
|||
its distributed nature in the modern state. Namely one has to |
|||
analyse the distributed nature of those AI technologies, |
|||
especially through networks and protocols, so that the link can |
|||
now be made to AI technologies becoming ‘legally’ more |
|||
profitable, in the hands of the upper-class. |
|||
In Protocol, Alexander Galloway describes how these |
|||
protocols changed the notion of power and how “control exists |
|||
after decentralization” 30 . Galloway argues that protocol has a |
|||
close connection to both Deleuze’s concept of control and |
|||
Foucault’s concept of biopolitics 31 by claiming that the key to |
|||
perceiving protocol as power is to acknowledge that “protocol |
|||
is an affective, aesthetic force that has control over life itself.” 32 |
|||
Galloway suggests that it is important to discuss more than the |
|||
technologies, and to look into the structures of control within |
|||
technological systems, which also include underlying codes and |
|||
protocols, in order to distinguish between methods that can |
|||
support collective production, e.g. sharing of AI technologies |
|||
within society, and those that put the AI technologies in the |
|||
hands of the powerful few. 33 Galloway’s argument in the |
|||
chapter Hacking is that the existence of protocols “not only |
|||
installs control into a terrain that on its surface appears |
|||
actively to resist it” 34 , but goes on to create the highly |
|||
controlled network environment. For Galloway hacking is “an |
|||
index of protocological transformations taking place in the |
|||
broader world of techno-culture.” 35 |
|||
Having said this, the prospect could be raised that |
|||
restorative justice might offer “a solution that could deliver |
|||
more meaningful justice” 36 . With respect to AI technologies, |
|||
and the potential inherent in them for AI crimes, instead of |
|||
following a retributive legislative approach, an ethical |
|||
|
|||
discourse, 37 with a deeper consideration for the sufferers of AI |
|||
crimes should be adopted. 38 We ask: could restorative justice |
|||
offer an alternative way of dealing with the occurrence of AI |
|||
crimes? 39 |
|||
Dale Millar and Neil Vidmar described two psychological |
|||
perceptions of justice. 40 One is behavioural control, following |
|||
the legal code as strictly as possible, punishing any |
|||
wrongdoer, 41 and second the restorative justice system, which |
|||
focuses on restoration where harm was done. Thus an |
|||
alternative approach for the ethical implementation of AI |
|||
technologies, with respect to legislation, might be to follow |
|||
restorative justice principles. Restorative justice would allow |
|||
for AI technologies to learn how to care about ethics. 42 Julia |
|||
Fionda describes restorative justice as a conciliation between |
|||
victim and offender, during which the offence is deliberated |
|||
upon. 43 Both parties try to come to an agreement on how to |
|||
achieve restoration for the damage done, to the situation |
|||
before the crime (here an AI crime) happened. Restorative |
|||
justice advocates compassion for the victim and offender, and a |
|||
consciousness on the part of the offenders as to the |
|||
repercussion of their crimes. The victims of AI crimes would |
|||
|
|||
not only be placed in front of a court, but also be offered |
|||
engagement in the process of seeking justice and restoration. 44 |
|||
Restorative justice might support victims of AI crimes better |
|||
than the punitive legal system, as it allows for the sufferers of |
|||
AI crimes to be heard in a personalised way, which could be |
|||
adopted to the needs of the victims (and offenders). As victims |
|||
and offenders represent themselves in restorative conferencing |
|||
sessions, these become much more affordable, 45 meaning that |
|||
the barrier to seeking justice due to the financial costs would |
|||
be partly eliminated, allowing for poor parties to be able to |
|||
contribute to the process of justice. This would benefit wider |
|||
society and AI technologies would not only be defined by a |
|||
powerful elite. Restorative justice could hold the potential not |
|||
only to discuss the AI crimes themselves, but also to get to the |
|||
root of the problem and discuss the cause of an AI crime. For |
|||
John Braithwaite restorative justice makes re-offending |
|||
harder. 46 |
|||
In such a scenario, a future AI system capable of committing |
|||
AI crimes would need to have knowledge of ethics around the |
|||
particular discourse of restorative justice. The implementation |
|||
of AI technologies will lead to a discourse around who is |
|||
responsible for actions taken by AI technologies. Even when |
|||
considering clearly defined ethical guidelines, these might be |
|||
difficult to implement, 47 due to the pressure of competition AI |
|||
systems find themselves in. That said, this speculation is |
|||
restricted to humanised artificial intelligence systems. The |
|||
main hindrance for AI technologies to be part of a restorative |
|||
justice system might be that of the very human emotion of |
|||
shame. Without a clear understanding of shame it will be |
|||
impossible to resolve AI crimes in a restorative manner. 48 |
|||
|
|||
Thus one might want to think about a humanised symbiosis |
|||
between humans and technology, 49 along the lines of Garry |
|||
Kasparov’s advanced chess, 50 as in advanced jurisprudence. 51 A |
|||
legal system where human and machine work together on |
|||
restoring justice, for social justice. Furthering this perspective, |
|||
we suggest that reflections brought by new materialism should |
|||
also be taken into account: not only as a critical perspective on |
|||
the engendering and anthropomorphic representation of AI, but |
|||
also to broaden the spectrum of what we consider to be justice |
|||
in relation to all the living world. Without this new perspective |
|||
the sort of idealized AI image of a non-living intelligence that |
|||
deals with enormous amounts of information risks to serve the |
|||
abstraction of anthropocentric views into a computationalist |
|||
acceleration, with deafening results. Rather than such an |
|||
implosive perspective, the application of law and jurisprudence |
|||
may take advantage of AI’s computational and sensorial |
|||
enhanced capabilities by including all information gathered |
|||
from the environment, also that produced by plants, animals |
|||
and soil. |
|||
|
|||
|
|||
[^1]: Cp. G. Chaslot, “YouTube’s A.I. was divisive in the US presidential election”, Medium, November 27, 2016. Available at: https://medium.com/the-graph/youtubes-ai-is-neutral-towards-clicks-but-is-biased-towards-people-and-ideas-3a2f643dea9a#.tjuusil7 d [accessed February 25, 2018]; E. Morozov, “The Geopolitics Of Artificial Intelligence”, FutureFest, London, 2018. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7g0hx9LPBq8 [accessed October 25, 2019]. |
|||
[^2]: Cp. M. Busby, “Use of ‘Killer Robots’ in Wars Would Breach Law, Say Campaigners”, The Guardian, August 21, 2018. Available at : https://web.archive.org/web/20181203074423/https://www.theguardian.com/science/2018/aug/21/use-of-killer-robots-in-wars-would-breach-law-say-campaigners [accessed October 25, 2019]. |
|||
[^3]: Cp. A. Hadzi, “Social Justice and Artificial Intelligence”, Body, Space & Technology, 18 (1), 2019, pp. 145–174. Available at: https://doi.org/10.16995/bst.318 [accessed October 25, 2019]. |
|||
[^4]: Cp. A. Kaplan and M. Haenlein, “Siri, Siri, in my Hand: Who’s the Fairest in the Land? On the Interpretations, Illustrations, and Implications of Artificial Intelligence”, Business Horizons, 62 (1), 2019, pp. 15–25. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bushor.2018.08.0 04; S. Legg and M. Hutter, A Collection of Definitions of Intelligence, Lugano, Switzerland, IDSIA, 2007. Available at: http://arxiv.org/abs/0706.3639 [accessed October 25, 2019].2 |
|||
[^5]: |
|||
[^6]: |
|||
[^7]: |
|||
[^8]: |
|||
[^9]: N. Bostrom, Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014. Cp. T. King, N. Aggarwal, M. Taddeo and L. Floridi, “Artificial Intelligence Crime: An Interdisciplinary Analysis of Foreseeable Threats and Solutions”, SSRN Scholarly Paper No. ID 3183238, Rochester, NY, Social Science Research Network, 2018. Available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3183238 [accessed October 25, 2019]. P. Mason, Clear Bright Future, London, Allen Lane Publishers, 2019. Mason, Clear Bright Future. S. Omohundro, “Autonomous Technology and the Greater Human Good”, Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence, 26 (3), 2014, pp. 303–315, here: p. 303.3 |
|||
[^10]: Cp. C. Cadwalladr, “Elizabeth Denham: ‘Data Crimes are Real Crimes”, The Guardian, July 15, 2018. Available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20181121235057/https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/jul/15/elizabeth-denham-data-protection-inf ormation-commissioner-facebook-cambridge-analytica [accessed October 25, 2019]. |
|||
[^11]: Cp. B. Olivier, “Cyberspace, Simulation, Artificial Intelligence, Affectionate Machines and Being Human”, Communicatio, 38 (3), 2012, pp. 261–278. https://doi.org/10.1080 /02500167.2012.716763 [accessed October 25, 2019]; E.A. Wilson, Affect and Artificial Intelligence, Washington, University of Washington Press, 2011. |
|||
[^12]: Cp. P.G. Ossorio, The Behavior of Persons, Ann Arbor, Descriptive Psychology Press, 2013. Available at: http://www.sdp.org/sdppubs- publications/the-behavior-of-perso ns/ [accessed October 25, 2019]. |
|||
[^13]: Cp. J. Jeffrey, “Knowledge Engineering: Theory and Practice”, Society for Descriptive Psychology, 5, 1990, pp. 105–122. |
|||
[^14]: Cp. P.G. Ossorio, Persons: The Collected Works of Peter G. Ossorio, Volume I. Ann Arbor, Descriptive Psychology Press, 1995. Available at: http://www.sdp.org/sdppubs-publications/persons-the-collected-works-of-peter-g-ossorio-volume-1/ [accessed October 25, 2019]. |
|||
[^15]: Cp. M. Mountain, “Lawsuit Filed Today on Behalf of Chimpanzee Seeking Legal Personhood”, Nonhuman Rights Blog, December 2, 2013. Available at: https://www.nonhumanrights.org/blog/lawsuit-filed-today-on-behalf-of-chimpanzee-seeking-legal-personhood/ [accessed January 8, 2019]; M. Midgley, “Fellow Champions Dolphins as ‘Non-Human Persons’”, Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics, January 10, 2010. Available at: https://www.oxfordanimalethics.com/2010/01/fellow -champions-dolphins-as-%E2%80%9Cnon-human-persons%E2%80%9D/ [accessed January 8, 2019]. |
|||
[^16]: Cp. R. Bergner, “The Tolstoy Dilemma: A Paradigm Case Formulation and Some Therapeutic Interventions”, in K.E. Davis, F. Lubuguin and W. Schwartz (eds.), Advances in Descriptive Psychology, Vol. 9, 2010, pp. 143–160. Available at: http://www.sdp.org/sdppubs-publications/advances-in-descriptive-psychology-vol-9; P. Laungani, “Mindless Psychiatry and Dubious Ethics”, Counselling Psychology4 Quarterly, 15 (1), 2002, pp. 23–33. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/09515070110102305 [accessed October 26, 2019]. |
|||
[^17]: W. Schwartz, “What Is a Person and How Can We Be Sure? A Paradigm Case Formulation”, SSRN Scholarly Paper No. ID 2511486, Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 2014. Available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2511486 [accessed October 25, 2019]. |
|||
[^18]: Cp. Mason, Clear Bright Future. |
|||
[^19]: Cp. M. Hoffman, and R. Pfeifer, “The Implications of Embodiment for Behavior and Cognition: Animal and Robotic Case Studies”, in W. Tschacher and C. Bergomi (eds.), The Implications of Embodiment: Cognition and Communication, Exeter, Andrews UK Limited, 2015, pp. 31– 58. Available at: https://arxiv.org/abs/1202.0440 |
|||
[^20]: N.J. Nilsson, The Quest for Artificial Intelligence, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009. |
|||
[^21]: Cp. R. Brooks, Cambrian Intelligence: The Early History of the New AI, Cambridge, MA, A Bradford Book, 1999. |
|||
[^22]: Cp. D. Crevier, AI: The Tumultuous History of the Search for Artificial Intelligence, New York, Basic Books, 1993; H.P. Newquist, The Brain Makers, Indianapolis, Ind: Sams., 1994. |
|||
[^23]: Cp. R. Brooks, “A Robust Layered Control System for a Mobile Robot”, IEEE Journal on Robotics and Automation, 2 (1), 1986, pp. 14–23. Available at: https://doi.org/510.1109/JRA.1986.1087032 [accessed October 25, 2019]. |
|||
24 |
|||
Cp. Brooks, Cambrian Intelligence. |
|||
25 |
|||
Cp. R. Pfeifer, “Embodied Artificial Intelligence”, presented at the |
|||
International Interdisciplinary Seminar on New Robotics, Evolution and |
|||
Embodied |
|||
Cognition, |
|||
Lisbon, |
|||
November, |
|||
2002. |
|||
Available |
|||
at: |
|||
https://www.informatics.indiana.edu/rocha/ |
|||
publications/embrob/pfeifer.html [accessed October 25, 2019]. |
|||
26 |
|||
Cp. T. Renzenbrink, “Embodiment of Artificial Intelligence |
|||
Improves Cognition”, Elektormagazine, February 9, 2012. Available at: |
|||
https://www.elektormagazine.com/art |
|||
icles/embodiment-of-artificial-intelligence-improves-cognition |
|||
[accessed |
|||
January 10, 2019]; G. Zarkadakis, “Artificial Intelligence & Embodiment: |
|||
Does Alexa Have a Body?”, Medium, May 6, 2018. Available at: |
|||
https://medium.com/@georgezarkadakis |
|||
/artificial-intelligence-embodiment-does-alexa-have-a-body-d5b97521a201 |
|||
[accessed January 10, 2019]. |
|||
27 |
|||
Cp. L. Steels and R. Brooks, The Artificial Life Route to Artificial |
|||
Intelligence: Building Embodied, Situated Agents, London/New York, Taylor |
|||
& Francis, 1995. |
|||
28 |
|||
M. Foucault, “Disciplinary Power and Subjection”, in S. Lukes (ed.), |
|||
Power, New York, NYU Press, 1986, pp. 229–242, here: p. 230. |
|||
29 |
|||
M. Foucault, Power, edited by C. Gordon, London, Penguin, 1980, |
|||
p. 34.6 |
|||
30 |
|||
A.R. Galloway, Protocol: How Control Exists After Decentralization, |
|||
Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 2004, p. 81. |
|||
31 |
|||
Cp. M. Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the |
|||
Collège de France, 1978–1979, London, Pan Macmillan, 2008. |
|||
32 |
|||
Galloway, Protocol, p. 81. |
|||
33 |
|||
Cp. Galloway, Protocol, p. 147. |
|||
34 |
|||
Galloway, Protocol, p. 146. |
|||
35 |
|||
Galloway, Protocol, p. 157. |
|||
36 |
|||
Crook, Comparative Media Law and Ethics, p. 310.7 |
|||
37 |
|||
Cp. R. Courtland, “Bias Detectives: The Researchers Striving to |
|||
Make Algorithms Fair”, Nature, 558, 2018, pp. 357–360. Available at: |
|||
https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-018-05469-3 [accessed October 25, 2019]. |
|||
38 |
|||
Cp. H. Fry, “We Hold People With Power to Account. Why Not |
|||
Algorithms?” The Guardian, September 17, 2018. Available at: |
|||
https://web.archive.org/web/201901021 |
|||
94739/https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/sep/17/power- |
|||
algorithms-technology-regulate [accessed October 25, 2019]. |
|||
39 |
|||
Cp. O. Etzioni, “How to Regulate Artificial Intelligence”, The New |
|||
York |
|||
Times, |
|||
January |
|||
20, |
|||
2018. |
|||
Available |
|||
at: |
|||
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/01/opinion/artificial-intelligence- |
|||
regulations-rules.html [accessed October 25, 2019]; A. Goel, “Ethics and |
|||
Artificial Intelligence”, The New York Times, December 22, 2017. Available |
|||
at: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/14/opinion/artificial-intelligence.html |
|||
[accessed October 25, 2019]. |
|||
40 |
|||
Cp. N. Vidmar and D.T. Miller, “Socialpsychological Processes |
|||
Underlying Attitudes Toward Legal Punishment”, Law and Society Review, |
|||
1980, pp. 565–602. |
|||
41 |
|||
Cp. M. Wenzel and T.G. Okimoto, “How Acts of Forgiveness Restore |
|||
a Sense of Justice: Addressing Status/Power and Value Concerns Raised by |
|||
Transgressions”, European Journal of Social Psychology, 40 (3), 2010, pp. |
|||
401–417. |
|||
42 |
|||
Cp. N. Bostrom and E. Yudkowsky, “The Ethics of Artificial |
|||
Intelligence”, in K. Frankish and W.M. Ramsey (ed.), The Cambridge |
|||
Handbook of Artificial Intelligence, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, |
|||
2014, pp. 316–334; Frankish and Ramsey, The Cambridge Handbook of |
|||
Artificial Intelligence. |
|||
43 |
|||
Cp. J. Fionda, Devils and Angels: Youth Policy and Crime, London, |
|||
Hart, 2005.8 |
|||
|
|||
44 |
|||
Cp. Nils Christie, “Conflicts as Property”, The British Journal of |
|||
Criminology, 17 (1), 1977, pp. 1–15. |
|||
45 |
|||
Cp. J. Braithwaite, “Restorative Justice and a Better Future”, in E. |
|||
McLaughlin and G. Hughes (eds.), Restorative Justice: Critical Issues, |
|||
London, SAGE, 2003, pp. 54–67. |
|||
46 |
|||
Cp. J. Braithwaite, Crime, Shame and Reintegration, Cambridge, |
|||
Cambridge University Press, 1989. |
|||
47 |
|||
Cp. A. Conn, “Podcast: Law and Ethics of Artificial Intelligence”, |
|||
Future |
|||
of |
|||
Life, |
|||
March |
|||
31, |
|||
2017. |
|||
Available |
|||
at: |
|||
https://futureoflife.org/2017/03/31/podcast-law-ethics-artificial-intelligence/ |
|||
[accessed September, 22 2018]. |
|||
48 |
|||
Cp. A. Rawnsley, “Madeleine Albright: ‘The Things that are |
|||
Happening are Genuinely, Seriously Bad’”, The Guardian, July 8, 2018. |
|||
Available |
|||
at: |
|||
https://web.archive.org/web/20190106193657/https://www.theguardian.com9 |
|||
|
|||
/books/2018/jul/08/madeleine-albright-fascism-is-not-an-ideology-its-a- |
|||
method-interview-fascism-a-warning [accessed October 25, 2019]. |
|||
49 |
|||
Cp. D. Haraway, “A Cyborg Manifesto”, Socialist Review, 15 (2), |
|||
1985. |
|||
Available |
|||
at: |
|||
http://www.stanford.edu/dept/HPS/Haraway/CyborgManifesto.html |
|||
[accessed October 25, 2019]; C. Thompson, “The Cyborg Advantage”, Wired, |
|||
March 22, 2010. Available at: https://www.wired.com/2010/03/st-thompson- |
|||
cyborgs/ [accessed October 25, 2019]. |
|||
50 |
|||
Cp. J. Hipp et al., “Computer Aided Diagnostic Tools Aim to |
|||
Empower Rather than Replace Pathologists: Lessons Learned from |
|||
Computational Chess”, Journal of Pathology Informatics, 2, 2011. Available |
|||
at: https://doi.org/10.4103/2153-3539.82050 [accessed October 25, 2019]. |
|||
51 |
|||
Cp. J. Baggini, “Memo to Those Seeking to Live for Ever: Eternal |
|||
Life Would be Deathly Dull”, The Guardian, July 8, 2018. Available at: |
|||
https://web.archive.org/web/20181225111455/https://www.theguardian.com |
|||
/commentisfree/2018/jul/08/live-for-ever-eternal-life-deathly-dull-immortality |
|||
[accessed October 25, 2019]. |
|||
|
|||
|
|||
|
|||
|
|||
@ -1,5 +0,0 @@ |
|||
Title: First thing |
|||
Date: 2020-11-13 16:46 |
|||
Category: Projections |
|||
|
|||
First website page! |
|||
@ -1,134 +0,0 @@ |
|||
Title: The Philosophy of Warnings |
|||
Author: Santiago Zabala |
|||
Category: Articles |
|||
<div class="colophon"> |
|||
<p> Published by: <br> Editing: <br> Design <br> Paper <br> Typeface <br> |
|||
</p><p id="colophon_right"> Sponsors: <br> Thanks: <br> Other <br> |
|||
</p></div> |
|||
<div class="first-page"> |
|||
<div id="title_edition">Of Whirlpools and Tornadoes <br> A Nourishing Network</div> |
|||
<div id="amro">AMRO 2020</div> |
|||
|
|||
<div id="author">Santiago Zabala</div> |
|||
<div id="title">The Philosophy of Warnings</div> |
|||
|
|||
|
|||
|
|||
<div id="published">Published in the *Institute of Arts and Ideas* </div> |
|||
</div> |
|||
<header id="pageheader-issue">A Nourishing Network</header> |
|||
<header id="pageheader-theme">The Philosophy of Warnings</header> |
|||
<header id="pagefooter">)))))</header> |
|||
|
|||
<div class="essay_content"> |
|||
<p>This month an undergraduate student told me his parents were using the |
|||
pandemic to persuade him to avoid philosophy as it could not prevent or |
|||
solve real emergencies. I told him to let them know that we find |
|||
ourselves in this global emergency because we haven't thought |
|||
philosophically *enough*. The increasingly narrow focus of experts this |
|||
century has prevented us from addressing problems from a global |
|||
perspective, which has always been the distinctive approach of |
|||
philosophy. This is evident in the little consideration we give to |
|||
warnings. Too often these are discarded as useless or |
|||
insignificant---much like philosophy---when in fact they are vital. |
|||
Though philosophers can't solve an ongoing emergency---philosophy was |
|||
never meant to solve anything---we can interpret their signs through a |
|||
"philosophy of warnings." Although this philosophy probably won't change |
|||
the views of my student's parents, it might help us to reevaluate our |
|||
political, environmental, and technological priorities for the future.</p> |
|||
|
|||
<p>Like recent philosophies of plants or |
|||
[[insects]{.underline}](http://cup.columbia.edu/book/a-philosophy-of-the-insect/9780231175791), |
|||
which emerged as a response to a global environmental crisis, a |
|||
"philosophy of warnings" is also a reaction to a global emergency that |
|||
requires philosophical elucidation. Although the ongoing pandemic has |
|||
triggered this new stance it isn't limited to this event. Nor is it |
|||
completely new. Warnings have been a topic of philosophical |
|||
investigation for centuries. The difference lies in the meaning these |
|||
concepts have acquired now. Before philosophy we had prophets to tell us |
|||
to be alert to the warnings of the Gods, but we secularized that office |
|||
into that of the philosopher, who, as one among equals, advised to heed |
|||
the signs; to use our imagination, because that is all we got. The |
|||
current pandemic has shown how little prepared we were for a global |
|||
emergency, even one whose coming has been |
|||
[[announced]{.underline}](https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/2020/04/experts-warned-pandemic-decades-ago-why-not-ready-for-coronavirus/) |
|||
for decades. But why haven't we been able to take these warnings |
|||
seriously? Before tackling this question, let's recall how warnings have |
|||
been addressed philosophically.</p> |
|||
|
|||
<p>Examples of warning philosophy can be traced back to Greek mythology and |
|||
Plato\'s *Apology*. Apollo provided Cassandra with the gift of prophecy |
|||
even though she could not convince others of the validity of her |
|||
predictions, and Socrates warned the Athenians---after he was sentenced |
|||
to death---that their inequity and mendacity undermined the democracy |
|||
they claimed to honor. Against Gaston Bachelard, who coined the term |
|||
"Cassandra complex" to refer to the idea that events could be known in |
|||
advance, Theodore Adorno warned that any claim to know the future should |
|||
be avoided. It is probably in this spirit that Walter Benjamin warned we |
|||
should pull the brake on the train of progress as it was stacking |
|||
disaster upon disaster. In line with Hannah Arendt's warnings of the |
|||
reemergence of totalitarianism after the Second World War, Giorgio |
|||
Agamben began his book on the current pandemic with "A Warning": |
|||
biosecurity will now serve governments to rule through a new form of |
|||
tyranny called "technological-sanitary" despotism.</p> |
|||
|
|||
<p>These examples illustrate the difference between warnings and |
|||
predictions. Warnings are sustained by signs in the present that request |
|||
our involvement, as Benjamin suggests. Predictions call out what will |
|||
take place regardless of our actions, a future as the only continuation |
|||
of the present, but warnings instead point toward what is to come and |
|||
are meant involve us in a radical break, a discontinuity with the |
|||
present signaled by alarming signs that we are asked to confront. The |
|||
problem is not the involvement warnings request from us but rather |
|||
whether we are willing to confront them at all. The volume of vital |
|||
warnings that we ignore---climate change, social inequality, refugee |
|||
crises---is alarming; it has become our greatest emergency.</p> |
|||
|
|||
<p>Indifference towards warnings is rooted in the ongoing global return to |
|||
order and realism in the twenty-first century. This return is not only |
|||
political, as demonstrated by the various right-wing populist forces |
|||
that have taken office around the world, but also cultural as the return |
|||
of some contemporary |
|||
[[intellectuals]{.underline}](https://arcade.stanford.edu/blogs/returning-order-through-realism) |
|||
to Eurocentric Cartesian realism demonstrates. The idea that we can |
|||
still claim access to truth without being dependent upon interpretation |
|||
presupposes that knowledge of objective facts is enough to guide our |
|||
lives. Within this theoretical framework warnings are cast off as |
|||
unfounded, contingent, and subjective, even though philosophers of |
|||
science such as Bruno Latour continue to |
|||
[[remind]{.underline}](https://www.wiley.com/en-us/Down+to+Earth%3A+Politics+in+the+New+Climatic+Regime-p-9781509530564) |
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us that no "attested knowledge can stand on its own." The internet and, |
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in particular, social media have intensified this realist view, further |
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discrediting traditional vectors of legitimation (international |
|||
agencies, major newspapers, or credentialed academics) and rendering any |
|||
tweet by an anonymous blogger credible because it presents itself as |
|||
transparent, direct, and genuine. "The quickness of social media, as |
|||
Judith Butler [[pointed |
|||
out]{.underline}](https://www.newstatesman.com/international/2020/09/judith-butler-culture-wars-jk-rowling-and-living-anti-intellectual-times), |
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allows for forms of vitriol that do not exactly support thoughtful |
|||
debate."</p> |
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|
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<p>Our inability to take warnings seriously has devastating consequences, |
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as recent months make clear. The central argument in favor of a |
|||
philosophy of warnings is not whether what it warns of comes to pass but |
|||
rather the pressure it exercises against those emergencies hidden and |
|||
subsumed under the global call to order. This pressure demands that our |
|||
political, environmental, and technological priorities be reconsidered, |
|||
revealing the alarming signs of democratic backsliding, biodiversity |
|||
loss, and commodification of our lives by surveillance capitalism. These |
|||
warnings are also why we should oppose any demand to "return to |
|||
normality," which signals primarily a desire to ignore what caused this |
|||
pandemic in the first place. A philosophy of warnings seeks to alter and |
|||
interrupt the reality we've become accustomed to.</p> |
|||
|
|||
<p>Although a philosophy of warnings will not prevent future emergencies, |
|||
it will resist the ongoing silencing of emergencies under the guise of |
|||
realism by challenging our framed global order and its realist |
|||
advocates. This philosophy is not meant to rescue us *from* emergencies |
|||
but rather rescue us *into* emergencies that we are trained to ignore.</p> |
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</div> |
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<div class="bio"> |
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[[Santiago Zabala]{.underline}](http://www.santiagozabala.com/) is ICREA |
|||
Research Professor of Philosophy at the Pompeu Fabra University in |
|||
Barcelona. His most recent book is *Being at Large: Freedom in the Age |
|||
of Alternative Facts* (McGill-Queen's University Press, 2020).</div> |
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