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# Post-Script |
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pad-to-print workflow to make the post-script of the 3rd Obfuscation Workshop |
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<http://www.obfuscationworkshop.org> |
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<https://3rd.obfuscationworkshop.org> |
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## About this Post-Script |
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This publication was made using a custom tool that allows for collaborative design, based on Flask, Pandoc, Etherpad, Etherdump and Weasyprint. The publication was written on one shared Etherpad and turned into a PDF using web-to-print techniques. This way of working allows for the writing, editing, copy-editing and design could happen within the same space. |
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Throughout the publication 9 *text pattern separators* appear that were generated partially in the last Study Group session by Cristina Cochior, Ero Balsa, Manetta Berends, and Pieter Delobelle. We performed a form of "slow computing" on the transcripts and chats from the sessions by looking for markers which traverse the multiple topics and registers that had been discussed during the Obfuscation Workshop. The last three separators come from the editing work of Amy Pickles who shared through email some of the words that reappeared often but were spelled differently each time. |
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## Generate the Post-Script |
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`$ sh post-script.sh` |
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- (input) downloads `post-script.md` from an etherpad |
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- (input) downloads `post-script.css` from another etherpad |
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- (processing) uses `post-script.template.html` with Pandoc to generate the PDF |
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- (output) generates `post-script.html` (for debugging) and `post-script.pdf` |
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etherpump gettext post-script.md > post-script.md |
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etherpump gettext post-script.css > css/post-script.css |
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pandoc -f markdown -t html -c css/post-script.css --toc --toc-depth=1 --standalone --template post-script.template.html post-script.md -o post-script.html |
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pandoc -f markdown --pdf-engine=weasyprint -c css/post-script.css --toc --toc-depth=1 --standalone --template post-script.template.html --reference-location=section post-script.md -o post-script.pdf |
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<!doctype html> |
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<html lang="$language$"> |
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<head> |
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<meta charset="utf-8"> |
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<link href="css/post-script.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" media="print"> |
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<title>$title$</title> |
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</head> |
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<body> |
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<section id="cover"> |
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<h1 class="title">$title$</h1> |
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<pre id="cover-pattern"> |
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Ranciere's the ignorant master ? |
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I just said "testing, testing, testing" |
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— did you hear it ? |
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And so, if this is a limited case use, just for |
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missing children, "how do we know that it's working ? |
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Is privacy sandbox an effort to turn the web into its own Facebook ? |
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Eliminate behavioral tracking completely and shift to another economic mode ? |
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Do we want more control over devices? If we do, who should control them ? |
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This is about those few rowdy elements or suspicious |
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people who we want to catch, and so, the form of resistance of |
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the form of obfuscation if you will, is to say, "how do you know that it works" ? |
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You really had to look for evidence of these kinds of |
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technologies' use, so the only kind of resistance we had was, "is this accurate?", and "does it work" ? |
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If it's a repressive government that then can siphon |
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information off, is it the appropriate level of governance for this and how do you ensure… ? |
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And when it became a sorting tool, the question or the form of resistance |
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became, "how are you doing this? Under what authority of law are you doing this?", right ? |
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What if, instead of trying to fly under the enemy’s radar, |
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we let that radar help us find allies with whom we can fly in formation ? |
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The ad side has extensive ad fraud such as fraudulent clicks. |
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What do you now know, what is real and what isn't real, in terms of what we can measure ? |
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How does that impact whether the whole complicated |
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exercise is even something worthwhile for us to |
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resist or engage with, or do we really need to overturn the whole thing ? |
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Tools like AdNauseam are still primarily focussed on an individual. |
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Sally, is it perhaps that we cannot take such an individual approach ? |
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We thought that without these technologies |
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we did a really good job, is the necessity of this really proportionate to our legal rights ? |
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Can you comment on the ethics of intentional/unintentional negative impact |
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of obfuscation / subversive AI on the *non-users* of obfuscation / subversive AI ? |
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Talking about how we can flip the script to talking about the fact |
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that these technologies are not inevitable, getting into the resistance, |
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getting into the advocacy game before the use become ubiquitous is a big challenge now, right ? |
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So how can we know for sure whether AdNauseam clicks work or not ? |
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Are the clicks that we successfully introduced experimental |
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click fraud, or can the clicks that we introduced be considered as fraud ? |
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With that in mind, |
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is browser-based obfuscation something that is still possible and meaningful ? |
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So now, from the side of publishers, it's an interesting question |
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as to whether the publishers would be interested in obfuscation |
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and what degree of obfuscation, and who would be obfuscated to who ? |
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So how well does this work ? |
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</pre> |
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</section> |
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<section id="cursorpage1"></section> |
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$if(toc)$ |
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<section id="TOC" role="doc-toc"> |
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$if(toc-title)$ |
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<h2 id="$idprefix$toc-title">$toc-title$</h2> |
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$endif$ |
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$table-of-contents$ |
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</section> |
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$endif$ |
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$body$ |
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<section id="cursorpage2"></section> |
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<section id="backcover"> |
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<pre id="backcover-pattern"> |
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Ranciere's the ignorant master ? |
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I just said "testing, testing, testing" |
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— did you hear it ? |
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And so, if this is a limited case use, just for |
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missing children, "how do we know that it's working ? |
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Is privacy sandbox an effort to turn the web into its own Facebook ? |
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Eliminate behavioral tracking completely and shift to another economic mode ? |
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Do we want more control over devices? If we do, who should control them ? |
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This is about those few rowdy elements or suspicious |
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people who we want to catch, and so, the form of resistance of |
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the form of obfuscation if you will, is to say, "how do you know that it works" ? |
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You really had to look for evidence of these kinds of |
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technologies' use, so the only kind of resistance we had was, "is this accurate?", and "does it work" ? |
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If it's a repressive government that then can siphon |
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information off, is it the appropriate level of governance for this and how do you ensure… ? |
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And when it became a sorting tool, the question or the form of resistance |
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became, "how are you doing this? Under what authority of law are you doing this?", right ? |
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What if, instead of trying to fly under the enemy’s radar, |
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we let that radar help us find allies with whom we can fly in formation ? |
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The ad side has extensive ad fraud such as fraudulent clicks. |
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What do you now know, what is real and what isn't real, in terms of what we can measure ? |
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|
How does that impact whether the whole complicated |
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exercise is even something worthwhile for us to |
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resist or engage with, or do we really need to overturn the whole thing ? |
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Tools like AdNauseam are still primarily focussed on an individual. |
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Sally, is it perhaps that we cannot take such an individual approach ? |
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We thought that without these technologies |
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we did a really good job, is the necessity of this really proportionate to our legal rights ? |
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Can you comment on the ethics of intentional/unintentional negative impact |
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of obfuscation / subversive AI on the *non-users* of obfuscation / subversive AI ? |
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Talking about how we can flip the script to talking about the fact |
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that these technologies are not inevitable, getting into the resistance, |
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getting into the advocacy game before the use become ubiquitous is a big challenge now, right ? |
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So how can we know for sure whether AdNauseam clicks work or not ? |
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Are the clicks that we successfully introduced experimental |
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click fraud, or can the clicks that we introduced be considered as fraud ? |
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With that in mind, |
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is browser-based obfuscation something that is still possible and meaningful ? |
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So now, from the side of publishers, it's an interesting question |
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as to whether the publishers would be interested in obfuscation |
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and what degree of obfuscation, and who would be obfuscated to who ? |
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So how well does this work ? |
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</pre> |
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</section> |
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</body> |
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</html> |
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After Width: | Height: | Size: 542 KiB |
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After Width: | Height: | Size: 406 KiB |
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