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122 lines
9.9 KiB
122 lines
9.9 KiB
<!doctype html>
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<html lang="$language$">
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<head>
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<meta charset="utf-8">
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<link href="post-script.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" media="print">
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<title>$title$</title>
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</head>
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<body>
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<section id="cover">
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<h1 class="title">$title$</h1>
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<pre id="cover-pattern">
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Ranciere's the ignorant master ?
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I just said "testing, testing, testing"
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— did you hear it ?
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And so, if this is a limited case use, just for
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missing children, "how do we know that it's working ?
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Is privacy sandbox an effort to turn the web into its own Facebook ?
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Eliminate behavioral tracking completely and shift to another economic mode ?
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Do we want more control over devices? If we do, who should control them ?
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This is about those few rowdy elements or suspicious
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people who we want to catch, and so, the form of resistance of
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the form of obfuscation if you will, is to say, "how do you know that it works" ?
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You really had to look for evidence of these kinds of
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technologies' use, so the only kind of resistance we had was, "is this accurate?", and "does it work" ?
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If it's a repressive government that then can siphon
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information off, is it the appropriate level of governance for this and how do you ensure… ?
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And when it became a sorting tool, the question or the form of resistance
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became, "how are you doing this? Under what authority of law are you doing this?", right ?
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What if, instead of trying to fly under the enemy’s radar,
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we let that radar help us find allies with whom we can fly in formation ?
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The ad side has extensive ad fraud such as fraudulent clicks.
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What do you now know, what is real and what isn't real, in terms of what we can measure ?
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How does that impact whether the whole complicated
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exercise is even something worthwhile for us to
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resist or engage with, or do we really need to overturn the whole thing ?
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Tools like AdNauseam are still primarily focussed on an individual.
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Sally, is it perhaps that we cannot take such an individual approach ?
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We thought that without these technologies
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we did a really good job, is the necessity of this really proportionate to our legal rights ?
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Can you comment on the ethics of intentional/unintentional negative impact
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of obfuscation / subversive AI on the *non-users* of obfuscation / subversive AI ?
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Talking about how we can flip the script to talking about the fact
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that these technologies are not inevitable, getting into the resistance,
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getting into the advocacy game before the use become ubiquitous is a big challenge now, right ?
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So how can we know for sure whether AdNauseam clicks work or not ?
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Are the clicks that we successfully introduced experimental
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click fraud, or can the clicks that we introduced be considered as fraud ?
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With that in mind,
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is browser-based obfuscation something that is still possible and meaningful ?
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So now, from the side of publishers, it's an interesting question
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as to whether the publishers would be interested in obfuscation
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and what degree of obfuscation, and who would be obfuscated to who ?
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So how well does this work ?
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</pre>
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</section>
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<section id="cursorpage1"></section>
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$if(toc)$
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<section id="TOC" role="doc-toc">
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$if(toc-title)$
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<h2 id="$idprefix$toc-title">$toc-title$</h2>
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$endif$
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$table-of-contents$
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</section>
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$endif$
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$body$
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<section id="cursorpage2"></section>
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<section id="backcover">
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<pre id="backcover-pattern">
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Ranciere's the ignorant master ?
|
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I just said "testing, testing, testing"
|
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— did you hear it ?
|
|
And so, if this is a limited case use, just for
|
|
missing children, "how do we know that it's working ?
|
|
Is privacy sandbox an effort to turn the web into its own Facebook ?
|
|
Eliminate behavioral tracking completely and shift to another economic mode ?
|
|
Do we want more control over devices? If we do, who should control them ?
|
|
This is about those few rowdy elements or suspicious
|
|
people who we want to catch, and so, the form of resistance of
|
|
the form of obfuscation if you will, is to say, "how do you know that it works" ?
|
|
You really had to look for evidence of these kinds of
|
|
technologies' use, so the only kind of resistance we had was, "is this accurate?", and "does it work" ?
|
|
If it's a repressive government that then can siphon
|
|
information off, is it the appropriate level of governance for this and how do you ensure… ?
|
|
And when it became a sorting tool, the question or the form of resistance
|
|
became, "how are you doing this? Under what authority of law are you doing this?", right ?
|
|
What if, instead of trying to fly under the enemy’s radar,
|
|
we let that radar help us find allies with whom we can fly in formation ?
|
|
The ad side has extensive ad fraud such as fraudulent clicks.
|
|
What do you now know, what is real and what isn't real, in terms of what we can measure ?
|
|
How does that impact whether the whole complicated
|
|
exercise is even something worthwhile for us to
|
|
resist or engage with, or do we really need to overturn the whole thing ?
|
|
Tools like AdNauseam are still primarily focussed on an individual.
|
|
Sally, is it perhaps that we cannot take such an individual approach ?
|
|
We thought that without these technologies
|
|
we did a really good job, is the necessity of this really proportionate to our legal rights ?
|
|
Can you comment on the ethics of intentional/unintentional negative impact
|
|
of obfuscation / subversive AI on the *non-users* of obfuscation / subversive AI ?
|
|
Talking about how we can flip the script to talking about the fact
|
|
that these technologies are not inevitable, getting into the resistance,
|
|
getting into the advocacy game before the use become ubiquitous is a big challenge now, right ?
|
|
So how can we know for sure whether AdNauseam clicks work or not ?
|
|
Are the clicks that we successfully introduced experimental
|
|
click fraud, or can the clicks that we introduced be considered as fraud ?
|
|
With that in mind,
|
|
is browser-based obfuscation something that is still possible and meaningful ?
|
|
So now, from the side of publishers, it's an interesting question
|
|
as to whether the publishers would be interested in obfuscation
|
|
and what degree of obfuscation, and who would be obfuscated to who ?
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So how well does this work ?
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</pre>
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</section>
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</body>
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</html>
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